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 1 Introduction
There is a large body of empirical literature on the eﬀects of oil price changes
on the U.S. economy; their magnitudes, transmission mechanisms, and his-
torical changes have been investigated. However, the underlying causes of oil
price changes have not been seriously considered until recently. The way oil
price changes aﬀect the economy may be very diﬀerent depending on where
the changes fundamentally come from. In particular, global factors such
as rapid growth in emerging economies and the integration of global sup-
ply chains seem to have become increasingly important for oil price changes
themselves and their transmission mechanisms.
Moreover, much remains unknown about the eﬀects of oil price changes in
countries other than the U.S. Some recent empirical international compara-
tive studies show that the magnitudes of the eﬀects of oil price changes diﬀer
greatly even among oil-importing countries. In particular, Japan is diﬀerent
in the sense that oil price increases have little, or even a positive, eﬀect on
real economic activity.1
In this paper, we investigate the underlying causes of oil price changes
and their transmission mechanisms in the U.S. and Japan. We decompose oil
price changes into their component parts and estimate the dynamic eﬀects
of each component on industry-level production and prices in both countries
using identiﬁed VAR models. Our models incorporate two major extensions
to the standard models used in previous studies. First, instead of treating
oil price changes as exogenous shocks, we identify the underlying demand
and supply shocks to the global oil market. Second, we use industry-level
data as well as aggregate data to investigate the transmission mechanisms
of oil price changes in more detail.2 Our models have three-block structures
comprising the global oil market block, the domestic macroeconomy block,
1Recent studies, including those of Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007) and Jim´ enez-Rodr´ ıguez
and S´ anchez (2004), show that the eﬀects of oil price changes in Japan are exceptionally
diﬀerent from other oil-importing countries.
2We focus on manufacturing industries for which lengthy periods of monthly time series
data are available. The quarterly GDP data that include nonmanufacturing industries are
not compatible with the short-run restrictions on our structural VAR models.
1and the domestic industry block. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt
to investigate the eﬀects of structural shocks to the global oil market on
industry-level production and prices.3
In identifying structural shocks to the global oil market, we closely follow
Kilian (2009) who proposes a structural decomposition of the real price of
oil into the following three components: oil supply shocks; shocks to the
global demand for all industrial commodities (global demand shocks);4 and
demand shocks that are speciﬁc to the global oil market (oil-speciﬁc demand
shocks). These three structural shocks that all tend to raise the oil price have
very diﬀerent eﬀects on domestic economic activity. While an unexpected
disruption of oil supply and an unexpected increase in oil-speciﬁc demand
tend to reduce domestic industrial production, an unexpected increase in
global demand raises domestic production. One of the main reasons why
the surge in oil prices from 2002 seems to have had a smaller eﬀect on real
economic activity than did the oil price increases of the 1970s is that the
recent oil price surge and economic expansion were simultaneously driven by
the global demand shocks.5
Examining the industry-level eﬀects of oil price changes facilitates under-
standing of their transmission mechanisms. Lee and Ni (2002) estimate the
eﬀects of exogenous oil price shocks using U.S. industry-level data and ﬁnd
that oil price shocks act mainly as supply shocks for oil-intensive industries,
such as petroleum reﬁneries, and act mainly as demand shocks for many other
3Kilian and Park (2009) brieﬂy analyze the eﬀects of structural shocks to the global oil
market on industry-level stock returns using a two-block VAR model.
4Kilian (2009) refers to this component as an “aggregate demand shock”. We do not
use this term because it can be confused with domestic aggregate shocks in our model.
5Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007) oﬀer other explanations for the smaller eﬀects: the smaller
share of oil in production; greater labor market ﬂexibility; and improvements in monetary
policy. Rather than consider these structural changes, we focus on changes in the nature
of the shocks to the global oil market. As mentioned in the appendix, estimating our
models for shorter sample periods does not greatly change most of the impulse responses
to the identiﬁed shocks, except those to the oil supply shocks. Hirakata and Sudo (2009)
point out that reduced oil supply variation and the associated correlation with total factor
productivity may be more important than structural changes for explaining the smaller
eﬀects of oil price changes on real economic activity.
2industries.6 They distinguish between demand and supply shocks depending
on whether production and prices move in the same or opposite directions
in response to the shocks. Our estimation results for the domestic industry
block reveal that whether oil price changes act as supply shocks or demand
shocks for each industry depends on what kind of underlying shock drives
the oil price changes, as well as on industry characteristics such as oil inten-
sity. For most industries in the U.S., the global demand shocks act mainly
as positive demand shocks, and the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks act mainly as
negative supply shocks.7 The oil supply shocks act mainly as negative supply
shocks for oil-intensive industries and act mainly as negative demand shocks
for less oil-intensive industries, as Lee and Ni (2002) found for exogenous oil
price shocks.
Comparing the U.S. and Japan also enhances our understanding of the
transmission mechanisms of oil price changes. In Japan, relative to the U.S.,
the oil supply shock has weaker negative or statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects,
the global demand shock has stronger positive eﬀects, and most importantly,
the oil-speciﬁc demand shock has positive rather than negative eﬀects on the
production of many industries. These ﬁndings seem to conﬁrm the results
of recent studies showing that the eﬀects of oil price increases on Japan’s
economy are small or even positive and very diﬀerent from those of other oil-
importing countries. The positive response of production to the oil-speciﬁc
demand shock might be the result of global demand shifts, especially in
automobiles, towards more oil-eﬃcient products made in Japan. In this
sense, unlike in the U.S., the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks act mainly as demand
shocks rather than supply shocks for many industries in Japan.
6Lee and Ni (2002) use Hamilton’s (1996) “net oil price increase” as an oil price variable.
Hooker (1996), in his reply to Hamilton (1996), casts doubt on the theoretical and empirical
validity of using this variable to represent oil price shocks to the macroeconomy and argues
that the use of cross-sectional data on industries, regions, or countries is required for a
better understanding of the eﬀects of oil price changes.
7The global demand shocks and the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks are demand shocks to
the global oil market and do not necessarily act as demand shocks to domestic aggregate
or industrial markets. For instance, the global demand shocks may include non-oil sector
productivity shocks that act as supply shocks to oil-importing countries’ domestic markets.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
our empirical framework and the identiﬁed structural shocks to the global
oil market. In Section 3, we brieﬂy discuss the estimation results for the
domestic macroeconomy blocks for the U.S. and Japan. Section 4 reports
the estimation results for the domestic industry blocks of both countries for
each industry. In Section 5, we brieﬂy survey the transmission mechanisms
of oil price changes and interpret our estimation results in more detail. We
also consider the background of the diﬀerences between the results for the
U.S. and Japan. Section 6 concludes. Appendix summarizes the estimation
results under several alternative assumptions and speciﬁcations of the model
to check the robustness of our main results.
2 Empirical Framework
2.1 The Structural VAR Model
Our VAR models comprise the global oil market block, the domestic macroe-
conomy block, and the domestic industry block. Following Lee and Ni (2002),
we impose block recursive restrictions so that the identiﬁed shocks to the
global oil market are the same for each country and the identiﬁed macroe-
conomic shocks are the same for each industry. In other words, domestic
variables do not aﬀect global oil market variables, and industry-level vari-
ables do not aﬀect aggregate variables.8 An identiﬁed VAR model has the
following form:
A0 Xt = A0 c + A0 B(L)Xt + ut
8This assumption may be too strong if movements in domestic economy in an individ-
ual country and linkages among countries have large impacts on the global oil market or
if movements in an individual industry and linkages among industries have large impacts
on the domestic aggregate economy. However, we impose these restrictions to enable com-
parison of impulse responses in diﬀerent countries and diﬀerent industries to the same
structural shock to the global oil market. As mentioned in the appendix, allowing domes-

















































X1t is an N1 dimensional column vector of global oil market variables; X2t
is an N2 dimensional column vector of domestic aggregate variables; X3t is
an N3 dimensional column vector of domestic industry-level variables. c1,
c2, and c3 are vectors of constants. B(L) is a block recursive matrix of
polynomials of the lag operator L. Moreover, we assume that A0 is a lower
triangular matrix such that the reduced-form residuals can be decomposed
into the structural shocks, ut. The covariance matrix of the structural shocks,
E(ut u
t), is given by an identity matrix of dimension N(= N1 + N2 + N3).
We use monthly data from 1973:1 to 2008:12.9 The lag length of the VAR
is 12. Following Kilian (2009), we consider oil supply shocks, shocks to the
global demand for all industrial commodities, and demand shocks that are
speciﬁc to the global oil market as structural shocks to the global oil market.
Correspondingly, we use the following three variables in the global oil market
block (N1 = 3): world crude oil production; the industrial production of the
OECD countries plus major six non-member economies (hereafter, world in-
dustrial production);10 and West Texas Intermediate spot crude oil prices.11
The last two variables diﬀer from those used by Kilian (2009).12 We use the
nominal price of oil rather than the real price because the deﬂator is endoge-
nous with respect to the domestic macroeconomy, which would violate our
assumption of a block recursive structure.13 For the domestic macroecon-
9Kilian (2009) also uses monthly data from 1973:1. Consistent data on the global oil
market before 1973 are diﬃcult to obtain.
10This index can be downloaded from OECD websites. The six non-member economies
are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, and South Africa. Fueki and
Kawamoto (2009) use this index to decompose oil price changes.
11Data for before 1982 are posted prices.
12Kilian (2009) uses an original measure of global real economic activity based on dry
cargo freight rates and the U.S. reﬁner acquisition cost of imported crude oil deﬂated by
the U.S. CPI (both in natural logs). The data on world crude oil production used by
Kilian (2009) are the same as those we use.
13Hamilton (2008) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) point out this problem. We do
5omy block, we only use aggregate industrial production (N2 = 1). For the
domestic industry block, we use industrial production and producer prices
(N3 = 2).14 We take ﬁrst diﬀerences in the logs of all variables. The data
on industrial production in each block and producer prices are seasonally
adjusted. The ordering of the variables in the VAR is as described above.15
The reduced form VAR is estimated consistently by the method of ordinary
least squares.
2.2 Structural Shocks to the Global Oil Market
We follow Kilian (2009) to identify the structural shocks to the global oil
market. The oil supply shocks are innovations to global oil production that
are assumed not to respond to innovations to the demand for oil within the
same month. The global demand shocks are innovations to world industrial
production that cannot be explained by the oil supply shocks. The oil-speciﬁc
demand shocks are innovations to the oil price that cannot be explained by
either the oil supply shocks or the global demand shocks. The oil-speciﬁc
demand shocks are supposed to reﬂect changes in precautionary demand
arising from uncertainty about future oil supply, and may also reﬂect changes
in speculative demand. Although we use slightly diﬀerent data from those
used by Kilian (2009), our estimation results for the global oil market block
are similar to his. Figure 1 plots the historical evolution (annual averages) of
the structural shocks implied by our model. As shown by Kilian (2009), there
was no unanticipated disruption of oil supply in 1978 or 1979 but there were
disruptions in 1980 and 1981 associated with the Iran–Iraq War. Positive
shocks to the global demand have been repeated since 2003 and a large
negative shock occurred in 2008. The occurrence of the oil-speciﬁc demand
not use the reﬁner acquisition cost of imported crude oil for the same reason.
14We use the Index of Industrial Production published by the Federal Reserve Board
and that published by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. For prices
data, we use the Producer Price Index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
Corporate Goods Price Index from the Bank of Japan.
15As mentioned in the appendix, changing the ordering in the domestic industry block
so that prices rather than production come ﬁrst makes little diﬀerence to the estimation
results.
6shocks has been constant throughout the sample period.
The cumulative responses of the three variables in the global oil market
block to one-standard-deviation structural shocks identiﬁed above are shown
in Figure 2. The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative
shock to oil production, whereas the other shocks have been normalized to
represent positive shocks such that all shocks tend to raise the oil price.
One-standard-error bands computed from a bootstrap method are indicated
by dashed lines. Of the three shocks, the oil-speciﬁc demand shock has the
largest and most persistent eﬀect on the oil price. It sharply raises the oil
price on impact, which remains high for a long time. The global demand
shock also has a large and persistent eﬀect, causing a gradual increase in
the oil price that lasts for about a year (12 months). The oil supply shock
has only a small and transitory eﬀect, causing a gradual increase in the oil
price that lasts for about 4 months. Whereas an unexpected global demand
increase is associated with increases in oil production and world industrial
production, an unexpected oil-speciﬁc demand increase is associated with
decreases, following a 10-month lag, in oil production and world industrial
production. An unexpected disruption of oil supply is also associated with
a decrease in oil production and its eﬀect on world industrial production is
statistically insigniﬁcant. These results imply that the eﬀects of the three
shocks on the oil price diﬀer in magnitude and persistence. Moreover, the
eﬀects of oil price changes on oil production and world industrial production
are very diﬀerent depending on what kind of underlying shock drives the oil
price changes.
Figure 3 plots a historical decomposition of the oil price into the contribu-
tion of the structural shocks. The annual rate of change (diﬀerence in logs)
in the oil price is indicated by the dashed line in each panel. The oil supply
shocks made a small contribution to nominal oil price movements, which is
consistent with the ﬁnding of Kilian (2009) for the real price of oil. Most
changes in the nominal oil price before 2000 were driven by the oil-speciﬁc
demand shocks. Rapid temporary changes, such as the sharp fall following
the collapse of the OPEC cartel in late 1985 and the spike after Iraq’s inva-
7sion of Kuwait in 1990 (which are not obvious from the annual ﬁgures), were
also attributable mainly to the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks. Meanwhile, the
persistent surge in the oil price from 2002 and the sharp fall in 2008 were
driven by the global demand shocks as well as by the oil-speciﬁc demand
shocks.
3 Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Oil Price Changes
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the estimation results for the domestic
macroeconomy block in our models for the U.S. and Japan and compare
them. The domestic macroeconomy block includes only one variable, ag-
gregate industrial production. The shock to this block captures all domes-
tic aggregate disturbances not driven by the structural shocks identiﬁed in
the global oil market block. Because our main concern in this paper is the
industry-level eﬀects of oil price changes and how these eﬀects compare in
the U.S. and Japan, we model the domestic macroeconomy block as simply
as possible.16
3.1 Eﬀects on Aggregate Production in the U.S.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative responses of aggregate industrial production
in the U.S. to one standard deviation of the three structural shocks identiﬁed
in the global oil market block and the domestic aggregate shock. The three
structural shocks to the global oil market, which all tend to raise the oil price,
have very diﬀerent eﬀects on domestic macroeconomic activity. Whereas the
oil supply shock and the oil-speciﬁc demand shock reduce industrial pro-
duction, the global demand shock raises production for about 10 months.
Whereas the decrease in production caused by the oil supply shock lasts for
about 10 months, the decrease caused by the oil-speciﬁc demand shock ac-
16As mentioned in the appendix, we tried an alternative speciﬁcation of the domestic
macroeconomy block that includes the short-term nominal interest rate and the real eﬀec-
tive exchange rate in addition to aggregate industrial production. This extension of the
domestic macroeconomy block, however, made little diﬀerence to our estimation results.
8celerates around 10 months after the shock. The domestic aggregate shock
raises production gradually and persistently.
Figure 5 plots a historical decomposition of U.S. aggregate industrial
production into the contribution of the three global shocks and the domestic
aggregate shock. The annual rate of change in U.S. industrial production
is indicated by the dashed line in each panel. Changes in U.S. industrial
production were driven mainly by the global demand shocks and the domestic
aggregate shocks. Because U.S. production accounts for a large share of
world production, it seems natural that the global demand shocks make a
substantial contribution to U.S. production. It is nonetheless remarkable
that movements in U.S. production in the 2000s have been driven mainly
by the global demand shocks despite the fact that the U.S. share of world
production declined over this period. By contrast, the contribution of the
domestic aggregate shocks has declined in the 2000s, although they made
a substantial contribution to U.S. expansion in the 1990s. Because the oil
price and industrial production move in the same direction in response to the
global demand shocks, the relationship between them seems to have changed
in the 2000s when movements in these two variables have been driven by the
global demand shocks.
3.2 Eﬀects on Aggregate Production in Japan
The cumulative responses of Japan’s aggregate industrial production are
shown in Figure 6. They are rather diﬀerent from those of the U.S. The
eﬀect of the oil supply shock on Japan’s industrial production is statistically
insigniﬁcant. The positive eﬀect of the global demand shock is larger and
more persistent than in the U.S. Most importantly, the oil-speciﬁc demand
shock has a positive, rather than negative, eﬀect on Japan’s production, at
least in the short run. Production starts decreasing around half a year (6
months) after a positive oil-speciﬁc demand shock. These ﬁndings suggest
that, unlike in other oil-importing countries including the U.S., the eﬀects
of oil price increases in Japan are either negligibly negative or even positive.
9The eﬀect of the domestic aggregate shock in Japan is larger than in the U.S.
A historical decomposition of Japan’s aggregate industrial production is
shown in Figure 7. The annual rate of change in Japan’s industrial production
is indicated by the dashed line in each panel. As in the U.S., changes in
Japan’s industrial production have been driven mainly by the global demand
shocks and the domestic aggregate shocks. Whereas the contraction of the
1990s was driven mainly by the domestic aggregate shocks, the expansion of
the 2000s was driven mainly by the global demand shocks. Relative to the
U.S. case, the domestic aggregate shocks have made a large contribution to
Japan’s industrial production.
4 Industry-Level Eﬀects of Oil Price Changes
In this section, we report the estimation results for the domestic industry
block. As mentioned in the introduction, our motivation for using industry-
level data is to investigate the transmission mechanisms of oil price changes
in the U.S. and Japan’s economies. In particular, an important question is
whether oil price changes act as supply shocks or demand shocks for each
industry. Before reporting the estimation results, we brieﬂy summarize basic
statistics on the industrial structures of the U.S. and Japan, which may
characterize the supply and demand sides of the transmission mechanisms.
We discuss the implications of the estimation results in detail in Section 5.
4.1 Basic Statistics on Industrial Structures
Table 1 shows the value-added shares of industrial production for the 12 in-
dustries in the U.S. and Japan selected for the present study. Although the
total share of our selected industries accounts for only around 40 percent of
U.S. aggregate manufacturing production, they include key industries for the
transmission of oil price changes such as petroleum reﬁneries and automotive
products, as discussed in Section 5. Because we must match industry-level
data on production and prices, we cannot select broadly deﬁned (three-digit
10NAICS) industries. For Japan, where the total value-added share of our se-
lected industries is around 80 percent, data on both production and prices
for broadly deﬁned industries are available, although lengthy time-series data
at the highly disaggregated industry level are not available. For instance,
petroleum reﬁneries are included in “petroleum and coal products” and au-
tomotive products are included in “transportation equipment”. Table 1 also
shows that some industries’ shares changed considerably during our sample
period. For instance, in the U.S., from 1973 to 2006, chemical materials and
petroleum reﬁneries increased their shares, whereas fabricated metal prod-
ucts and machinery decreased their shares. In Japan, from 1975 to 2005,
shares for the electrical machinery and transportation equipment increased,
whereas the share for the ceramic, stone, and clay products decreased.
We consider two industry characteristics: oil intensity and export depen-
dence. The former relates to the cost share of oil in production and is a key
characteristic for the supply channel in the transmission of oil price changes,
as discussed in Section 5. The latter relates to the export share of shipments
and is a key characteristic for the eﬀects of the global demand shocks. We
measure these characteristics for both countries based on the 2000 Japan-U.S.
input-output table from Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.
Table 2 shows the cost share of oil in each industry in both countries.17
The oil intensity of the petroleum and coal products (which includes petroleum
reﬁneries) is particularly high in both countries. Oil intensity is also relatively
high in ceramics, stone, and clay products, chemical products, steel and steel
products, and non-steel metals and products. We term these industries “oil-
intensive industries” and refer to the others as “less oil-intensive industries”.
Based on the 12-industry average, Japan is less oil-intensive than the U.S.
Table 3 shows the export share of shipments in each industry in both
countries. The export dependences of precision instruments, electric ma-
chinery, general machinery, and transportation equipment (which includes
automotive products) are particularly high in both countries. These indus-
tries are termed “export-dependent industries”. Based on the 12-industry
17The ﬁgures show the input cost shares of “mining” and “petroleum and coal products”.
11average, Japan is more export-dependent than the U.S.
4.2 Eﬀects on Industry-Level Production and Prices
in the U.S.
Figures 8 through 13 illustrate the estimated cumulative responses of pro-
duction and prices of the 12 selected industries in the U.S. to one standard
deviation of the three structural shocks identiﬁed in the global oil market
block. Each response is accompanied by one-standard-error bands computed
from a bootstrap method. The graphs for the selected industries are pre-
sented in order of oil intensity. Note that the scales of the responses are
diﬀerent for diﬀerent industries. For cross-industry comparisons, we show
the magnitudes of the 12-month cumulative responses for all 12 industries
in Figure 14. In addition, in Table 4, we summarize the signs of the peak
responses within 20 months to each shock, following Lee and Ni (2002).18
This table enables us to identify the main eﬀects of each structural shock for
each industry. If production and price move in the same (opposite) direction
after a shock, the dominant eﬀect of that shock is on the demand (supply)
side.
First we examine the responses of production and prices to the oil supply
shock, as shown in Figures 8 and 9. In most industries, an unexpected
disruption of oil supply causes a gradual decline in production that lasts for
about a year. The production of petroleum reﬁneries declines on impact and
then continues to decline gradually and persistently. The responses of prices
vary across industries. An unexpected oil supply disruption signiﬁcantly
raises the price of petroleum reﬁneries and reduces the prices of wood product
and electrical equipment. It tends to raise the prices of oil-intensive industries
and tends to reduce the prices of less oil-intensive industries, although these
eﬀects for many industries are only partially (in limited periods) statistically
18Rather than plot the cumulative responses of ﬁrst-diﬀerence series to permanent level
shocks as we do, Lee and Ni (2002) plot the responses of level variables to temporary level
shocks. Therefore, our responses have diﬀerent interpretations, particularly in the long
run, from theirs.
12signiﬁcant. This implies that the oil supply shocks act mainly as supply
shocks for oil-intensive industries and act mainly as demand shocks for less
oil-intensive industries. This ﬁnding is similar to that obtained by Lee and
Ni (2002) for exogenous oil price shocks.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the responses to the global demand shock.
An unexpected expansion in the global demand for all industrial commodities
gradually increases the production of most industries. Whereas increases in
the production of some export-dependent industries such as machinery and
electrical equipment last for about a year, the increases in many industries
last for only a few months or half a year. In particular, automotive products,
furniture and related product, wood product, and some oil-intensive indus-
tries including petroleum reﬁneries, experience only transitory increases in
production. At the same time, a positive global demand shock gradually
and persistently increases the prices of most industries. The price increase in
petroleum reﬁneries is the largest among the industries. Prices in many less
oil-intensive industries also increase, but by less than do those in oil-intensive
industries. These results imply that the global demand shocks act mainly as
demand shocks, at least in the short run, for most industries. Note that these
global demand shocks act as positive demand shocks for many industries, in
contrast to the oil supply shocks which act as negative demand shocks for
less oil-intensive industries.
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the responses to the oil-speciﬁc demand shock.
An unexpected increase in demand that is speciﬁc to the global oil market
gradually and persistently reduces the production of most industries, with a
half-year lag. The decrease in automotive production is the largest, and gen-
erally, production declines are relatively large in less oil-intensive industries.
At the same time, a positive oil-speciﬁc demand shock persistently increases
the prices of most industries. In petroleum reﬁneries, prices increase on im-
pact and then continue to rise until around a year after the shock, which is
the largest increase among the industries. Prices in many less oil-intensive
industries, including automotive products, also increase, but generally by less
than those in oil-intensive industries. These results imply that the oil-speciﬁc
13demand shocks act mainly as supply shocks for most industries.
4.3 Eﬀects on Industry-Level Production and Prices
in Japan
Figures 15 through 20 illustrate the estimated cumulative responses of pro-
duction and prices of the 12 selected industries in Japan to the same struc-
tural shocks. The magnitudes of the 12-month cumulative responses for all
12 industries are shown in Figure 21. The signs of the peak responses are
summarized in Table 5.
Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the responses to the oil supply shock. An
unexpected disruption of oil supply gradually decreases petroleum and coal
production, which includes production of petroleum reﬁneries, and this lasts
for about a year. There are declines in production of many other industries,
but only partially statistically signiﬁcant. Disruption to oil supply gradually
increases prices of petroleum reﬁneries, and this also lasts for about a year.
There are price falls in other oil-intensive industries such as ceramic, stone,
and clay products and iron and steel products, but only partially statistically
signiﬁcant. The eﬀects on prices of less oil-intensive industries are mostly
statistically insigniﬁcant. Overall, the oil supply shocks act mainly as supply
shocks for petroleum reﬁneries but have insigniﬁcant eﬀects on many other
industries in Japan.
The responses to the global demand shock are shown in Figures 17 and 18.
As in the U.S., an unexpected expansion in the global demand for all indus-
trial commodities gradually increases production of most industries in Japan.
Whereas the increases in production of some oil-intensive industries such as
petroleum and coal products last for only about half a year, production in-
creases in many less oil-intensive and export-dependent industries last for
about a year, and the eﬀects are larger than those in oil-intensive industries.
Compared with the U.S., the global demand shocks have persistent eﬀects
on production in a wider range of industries, which include transportation
equipment. At the same time, a positive oil-speciﬁc demand shock gradually
14and persistently raises the prices of many industries, particularly oil-intensive
industries. By contrast, prices of some less oil-intensive industries such as
precision instruments and transportation equipment fall, at least in the short
run. As in the U.S., the global demand shocks act mainly as demand shocks
for most industries in Japan. However, the magnitude and persistence of the
eﬀects in some industries diﬀer greatly from the corresponding eﬀects in the
U.S.
The responses to the oil-speciﬁc demand shock are shown in Figures 19
and 20. Of the three structural shocks, the responses to this shock diﬀer
most between the U.S. and Japan. Unlike in the U.S., an unexpected in-
crease in demand that is speciﬁc to the global oil market raises rather than
reduces production of most industries in Japan, at least in the short run.
Whereas production increases in oil-intensive industries are small and tran-
sitory, those in some less oil-intensive and export-dependent industries, such
as general machinery, precision instruments, and transportation equipment,
last for about a year. Therefore, the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks have similar
eﬀects on production to the global demand shocks, although the latter have
much larger eﬀects. At the same time, a positive oil-speciﬁc demand shock
gradually and persistently raises the prices of most industries. Unlike in the
U.S., the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks act mainly as demand shocks rather than
supply shocks for many industries in Japan.
This comparison with the U.S. reveals that the oil supply shock has
weaker negative or statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects, the global demand shock
has stronger positive eﬀects, and the oil-speciﬁc demand shock has posi-
tive rather than negative eﬀects on production of many industries in Japan.
Moreover, the eﬀects on industry-level prices in Japan of the three structural
shocks that all tend to raise the oil price are weaker than in the U.S. We will
discuss the background of these diﬀerences in the next section.
155 Discussion
The estimation results for the domestic industry block in Section 4 reveal
that whether the oil price changes act as supply shocks or demand shocks for
each industry depends on what kind of underlying shock drives the oil price
changes. It also depends on each industry’s characteristics: that is, oil price
changes tend to act more as supply shocks for oil-intensive industries and tend
to act more as demand shocks for less oil-intensive industries, as shown by Lee
and Ni (2002). However, our results imply that the global demand shocks
act mainly as demand shocks and that the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks act
mainly as supply shocks in the U.S., for most industries. Considering this key
ﬁnding, we brieﬂy survey the transmission mechanisms of oil price changes
and interpret our estimation results in more detail. The three structural
shocks to the global oil market identiﬁed in our model are transmitted to each
industry through various channels, some of which are familiar and others are
less familiar in the literature.19
Another key ﬁnding is that the transmission mechanisms diﬀer consid-
erably between the U.S. and Japan. In particular, the oil-speciﬁc demand
shocks in Japan act mainly as demand shocks rather than supply shocks for
many industries. Following discussion of the transmission mechanisms, we
consider the background of the diﬀerences between the U.S. and Japan.
5.1 Transmission Mechanisms of Oil Price Changes
Oil price changes have been viewed traditionally as cost shocks or productiv-
ity shocks to oil-importing countries, and many studies focus on the supply
side of their transmission mechanisms.20 When an oil price hike pushes up
production costs, producers reduce their use of oil, which may lower the
19The survey is limited to mechanisms relating to our estimation results. Because our
models do not explicitly consider either monetary policy shocks or endogenous responses
of monetary policy to oil price changes, we ignore the relationship between oil prices and
monetary policy.
20For instance, Bruno and Sachs (1985) extensively study the supply side of the trans-
mission mechanisms of oil price changes.
16productivity of capital and labor. This cost channel or supply channel of
transmission operates mainly in oil-intensive industries. According to our es-
timation results, the magnitudes of the price responses to any kind of struc-
tural shock to the global oil market are relatively large in oil-intensive in-
dustries, particularly petroleum reﬁneries. However, production responses in
oil-intensive industries are not particularly large. The eﬀect of an oil-speciﬁc
demand shock in the U.S. on production of oil-intensive industries is smaller
than that of less oil-intensive industries such as automotive products. The
production of oil-intensive industries increases rather than decreases in re-
sponse to a positive global demand shock, which moves in the same direction
as prices. Because the economy-wide cost share of oil is low, it is reasonable
to suppose that the direct eﬀect of the cost channel by itself cannot explain
the whole impact of oil price changes on economic activity.21
Another important channel of the transmission is on the demand side of
the economy. Kilian (2008) categorizes the eﬀects of oil price changes on
consumption expenditure into a discretionary income eﬀect, a precautionary
savings eﬀect, an uncertainty eﬀect, and an operating cost eﬀect.22 The ﬁrst
two eﬀects, which operate through consumers’ present and expected future
incomes, relate to a wide range of goods and services, whereas the other
two eﬀects relate only to consumer durables. The uncertainty eﬀect of oil
price changes causes consumers to postpone irreversible purchases of con-
sumer durables, and the operating cost eﬀect causes consumers to refrain
from purchasing oil-using durables, particularly automobiles. According to
our estimation results, the U.S. automotive industry exhibits the largest pro-
duction decrease following a positive oil-speciﬁc demand shock. This implies
that the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks act as demand shocks as well as supply
shocks for the U.S. automotive industry, though the negative eﬀect on prices
through the demand channel is not as strong as the positive eﬀect on prices
21Hamilton (2008) discusses the empirical relevance of the cost channel in his survey
of the mechanisms through which the eﬀects of oil price changes are transmitted to the
macroeconomy.
22Oil price changes also aﬀect ﬁrms’ investment expenditures, but these eﬀects are con-
sidered small by Kilian (2008).
17through the supply channel. Note that all the above eﬀects of oil price in-
creases reduce consumption expenditure; that is, they act as negative demand
shocks. By contrast, the global demand shocks identiﬁed in our model act
mainly as positive demand shocks. This is because, by construction, these
shocks incorporate positive shocks to the income of U.S. or other countries’
residents who purchase U.S. products. More precisely, however, the global
demand shocks act as both positive and negative demand shocks that oﬀset
each other: the positive eﬀects operate through positive income shocks and
the negative eﬀects operate through the oil price increases induced by the
same shocks. According to our estimation results, a positive global demand
shock raises U.S. automotive production only slightly and temporarily, rel-
ative to other less oil-intensive industries such as machinery and electrical
equipment. This is because the negative eﬀect that operates through the
oil price increase in the automotive industry is stronger than in other less
oil-intensive industries.
If oil price changes intensively aﬀect a certain sector of the economy,
whether through the supply or demand channel, sectoral shifts of resources
between the aﬀected sector and less aﬀected sectors are likely to occur. In
the process of such sectoral shifts, some resources might be unemployed by
any sector because of frictions in capital and labor markets, which may fur-
ther depress aggregate economic activity and amplify the negative eﬀects of
oil price changes. This reallocation eﬀect has been discussed by many re-
searchers including Hamilton (1988) and Davis and Haltiwanger (2001). Our
estimation results, however, do not provide clear evidence of signiﬁcant re-
source reallocation across industries either for the U.S. or Japan. Although
the magnitudes of the production responses to each type of shocks diﬀer con-
siderably across industries, the directions of the responses are the same for
most industries.
Meanwhile, some of our results imply demand shifts across countries. The
production increases in export-dependent industries, such as machinery and
electric equipment, following a positive global demand shock tend to be larger
and more persistent than those of less export-dependent industries, both in
18the U.S. and Japan. This is because, as mentioned above, the global demand
shocks partly reﬂect changes in the incomes of foreign residents who purchase
domestic products. Moreover, demand shifts from U.S. products to Japanese
products might constitute an explanation for the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the eﬀects of the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks between the two countries, as
discussed in the next subsection. These global transmission channels of oil
price changes have received relatively less attention in the literature.23
5.2 Diﬀerences between the U.S. and Japan
Based on the above discussion, we consider the background of the diﬀerences
between our estimation results for the U.S. and Japan. For Japan, in many
industries, the production responses to the oil supply shock are weaker or
statistically insigniﬁcant and those to the global demand shock are stronger
than those of the U.S. These diﬀerences are explained by the facts that
Japan’s economy is less oil-intensive and more export-dependent than the
U.S., as shown in Section 4.1.
The biggest diﬀerence is in the eﬀects of the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks.
For many industries in Japan, production as well as prices increase rather
than decrease in response to a positive oil-speciﬁc demand shock. There-
fore, the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks act mainly as positive demand shocks,
similarly to the global demand shocks. This implies the existence of some
oil-speciﬁc factors, which cannot be explained by the global demand shocks,
causing global demand shifts towards Japanese products. We consider the oil
eﬃciency of Japanese products as one of such factors. In particular, Japanese
automotive manufacturers have produced smaller and more oil-eﬃcient cars
than have U.S. manufacturers since the 1970s. By causing a massive demand
shift towards small cars, the oil crisis of the 1970s damaged U.S. carmakers,
which produced only large cars, as documented by Bresnahan and Ramey
(1993) among others. At the same time, Japanese carmakers sharply raised
23An exception is Abeysinghe (2001), who estimates the “indirect eﬀect” of oil price
changes on the GDP growth of 12 economies, mainly Asian emerging economies, which is
transmitted through a trade matrix.
19their market shares in the U.S.24 In 2004–06, Japanese cars were still more
fuel eﬃcient than U.S. cars, as shown in Figure 22, and the market share
of Japanese cars in the U.S. has been still increasing. These demand shifts
might constitute an explanation for why U.S. and Japanese automotive pro-
duction diﬀer in their responses to the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks; among our
selected industries, automotive production diﬀers the most between the U.S.
and Japan. Moreover, the demand for automotive products induces produc-
tion of many other industries such as steel and precision instruments. Al-
though the value-added share of passenger cars (excluding buses and trucks)
in Japanese industrial production is only about 8.5 percent, the economy-
wide impacts of demand shifts towards Japanese cars may be substantial.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we decomposed oil price changes into their component parts
following Kilian (2009) and estimated the dynamic eﬀects of each compo-
nent on industry-level production and prices in the U.S. and Japan using
identiﬁed VAR models. Our results reveal that the way oil price changes
aﬀect each industry depends on what kind of underlying shock drives the oil
price changes as well as on industry characteristics. We also found that the
transmission mechanisms diﬀer considerably between the U.S. and Japan.
Our results imply that global demand shifts across countries are impor-
tant factors for oil price changes themselves and their transmission mech-
anisms. We considered the global demand shocks as underlying causes of
oil price changes and discussed the eﬀects of global demand shifts towards
more oil-eﬃcient products. For a better understanding of the transmission
mechanisms, it would be worth investigating diﬀerences in the eﬀects of oil
price changes among countries other than the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, de-
veloping open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that
24There are many empirical studies on the U.S. automobile market. For instance, Gold-
berg (1998) examines the eﬀects of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards en-
acted in 1975 on automobile sales, prices, and fuel consumption, considering demand shifts
towards more fuel-eﬃcient vehicles.
20incorporate the global oil market is also a promising way of deepening our
understanding and would enhance the interpretation of empirical results on
the eﬀects of oil price changes.
Appendix: Robustness Checks
In this appendix, we summarize the estimation results under several alterna-
tive assumptions and speciﬁcations of the model to check the robustness of
our main results.25
First, we changed the sample period of estimation, while keeping the
model unchanged. Although we focus on changes in the nature of the shocks
rather than structural changes as an explanation for the weakening eﬀects
of oil price changes on real economic activity (as stated in footnote 5), it is
possible to estimate our models for shorter sample periods and check whether
structural changes occurred during the full sample period. We divided the
sample period into the two sub-periods, 1973:1 to 1983:12 and 1984:1 to
2008:12, following Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007) in choosing the break point.
In the later sub-period, the negative eﬀects of the oil supply shocks on pro-
duction were weakened in both the U.S. and Japan, the positive eﬀects of
the global demand shocks on production were strengthened in Japan, and
the eﬀects of the oil-speciﬁc demand shocks were little changed in both coun-
tries. Therefore, structural changes occurred only in the eﬀects of oil price
changes caused by the oil supply shocks (and the global demand shocks in
Japan) which made historically a small contribution to oil price movements
(as shown in Figure 3). Overall, the directions of the responses to the three
structural shocks were little changed in each industry.
Second, we partially relaxed the block recursive restrictions and assumed
that domestic aggregate variables could aﬀect global oil market variables.
Third, we included in the domestic macroeconomy block the short-term nom-
inal interest rate and the real eﬀective exchange rate in addition to aggregate
25The detailed results of the robustness checks will be available upon request.
21industrial production.26 Lastly, we changed the ordering of the variables in
the domestic industry block (industrial production and producer prices) so
that prices rather than production come ﬁrst. We found that all these changes
made little diﬀerences to our main results.
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75767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899000102030405060708Figure 8: Cumulative responses of production to oil supply shock (U.S.)
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oil produtionFigure 9: Cumulative responses of prices to oil supply shock (U.S.)
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oil produtionFigure 10: Cumulative responses of production to global demand shock (U.S.)
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world iipFigure 11: Cumulative responses of prices to global demand shock (U.S.)
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world iipFigure 12: Cumulative responses of production to oil-specific demand shock (U.S.)
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oil priceFigure 13: Cumulative responses of prices to oil-specific demand shock (U.S.)
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PriceFigure 15: Cumulative responses of production to oil supply shock (Japan)
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PriceFigure 22: Average fuel consumption of cars sold in U.S.
Note: Fuel consumption is calculated for each company as 2004-2006 averages.
          Fuel consumption of different vehicle types are averaged using their sales volume as weights.
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US companies Japanese companiesTable 1: Value-added share of production
<U.S.>
Industry Share in 2006 (%) Share in 1973 (%)
Fabricated metal product 5.5 6.7
Chemical materials 5.4 4.4
Machinery 5.0 8.6
Petroleum refineries 3.9 1.3
Automotive products 3.3 3.5
Plastics and rubber products 3.2 2.9
Paper 2.6 3.1
Nonmetallic mineral product 2.3 2.7
Furniture and related product 1.5 1.6
Wood product 1.4 2.1
Iron and steel products  1.4 3.1
Electrical equipment 0.6 1.1
12-industry total 36.3 41.3
<Japan>
Industry Share in 2005 (%) Share in 1975 (%)
Electric machinery and equipment 18.4 11.0
Transportation equipment 16.9 11.8
General machinery and equipment 13.2 12.8
Chemicals and related products 11.8 9.5
Iron and steel products 6.0 6.6
Metal products 5.7 5.0
Plastic products 3.8 2.8
Ceramic, stone and clay products 2.9 5.7
Pulp, paper and related products 2.4 3.5
Nonferrous metals and products 2.1 1.9
Precision instruments 1.0 1.6
Petroleum and coal products 1.0 2.9
12-industry total 85.2 75.3
Source: Industrial Production, Federal Reserve Board.
      Indices of Industrial Production, Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.Table 2: Oil intensity (Cost share of mining and petroleum and coal products)
<U.S.>
Industry Share in 2000 (%)
Petroleum and coal products 68.5
Ceramic, stone and clay products 6.2
Chemical products 6.2
Steel and steel products 5.5
Non-steel metals and products 2.8
Pulp, paper and wooden products 0.7
Plastic, rubber and leather products 0.5







Industry Share in 2000 (%)
Petroleum and coal products 40.6
Ceramic, stone and clay products 9.7
Non-steel metals and products 7.3
Steel and steel products 6.4
Chemical products 4.8
Pulp, paper and wooden products 1.2
Other metal products 0.5






Source: The 2000 Japan-U.S. input-output table,
      Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.Table 3: Export dependence (Export share of shipments)
<U.S.>





Non-steel metals and products 17.3
Chemical products 17.2
Plastic, rubber and leather products 9.6
Pulp, paper and wooden products 6.6
Steel and steel products 6.4
Ceramic, stone and clay products 6.4
Other metal products 6.3
Petroleum and coal products 5.7
12-industry average 14.9
<Japan>





Steel and steel products 17.0
Chemical products 15.6
Non-steel metals and products 15.3
Plastic, rubber and leather products 8.6
Ceramic, stone and clay products 6.9
Other metal products 3.8
Pulp, paper and wooden products 2.1
Petroleum and coal products 1.6
12-industry average 17.1
Source: The 2000 Japan-U.S. input-output table,
      Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.Table 4: Signs of peak responses (U.S.)
<Oil Supply Shock>
Peak effect Peak effect
Industry on output on prices Oil supply shock effects
Petroleum refineries  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Nonmetallic mineral product  -
*  - Decrease in demand
Chemical materials  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Iron and steel products   -  +
* Decrease in supply
Paper  -
*   0
Plastics and rubber products  -
*   0
Fabricated metal product  -
*   0
Automotive products  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Furniture and related product  -
*   0
Wood product  -
*  -
* Decrease in demand
Machinery  -
*   0
Electrical equipment  -  -
* Decrease in demand
<Global Demand Shock>
Peak effect Peak effect Global demand shock
Industry on output on prices effects
Petroleum refineries  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Nonmetallic mineral product  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Chemical materials  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Iron and steel products   +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Paper  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Plastics and rubber products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Fabricated metal product  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Automotive products Mixed  +
*
Furniture and related product Mixed  +
*




* Increase in demand
Electrical equipment  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
<Oil-Specific Demand Shock>
Peak effect Peak effect Oil-Specific demand
Industry on output on prices shock effects
Petroleum refineries  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Nonmetallic mineral product  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Chemical materials  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Iron and steel products   -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Paper  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Plastics and rubber products  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Fabricated metal product  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Automotive products  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Furniture and related product  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Wood product  -
*  -
* Decrease in demand
Machinery  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Electrical equipment  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Note: "+" and "-" represent peak positive and negative responses. "*" means that
         the peak responses are significant. "0" means the peak responses are negligible.
         "Mixed" means that the positive and negative responses are of similar magnitudes.Table 5: Signs of peak responses (Japan)
<Oil Supply Shock>
Peak effect Peak effect
Industry on output on prices Oil supply shock effects
Petroleum and coal products  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
Ceramic, stone and clay products  -
*  -
* Decrease in demand
Nonferrous metals and products  -  - Decrease in demand
Iron and steel products   0  -
*
Chemicals and related products  -   0
Pulp, paper and related products  -
*  - Decrease in demand
Metal products  -
*  - Decrease in demand
Plastic products  -
*  +
* Decrease in supply
General machinery and equipment   0   0
Precision instruments  -
*   0
Transportation equipment   0   0
Electric machinery and equipment  -
*   0
<Global Demand Shock>
Peak effect Peak effect Global demand shock
Industry on output on prices effects
Petroleum and coal products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Ceramic, stone and clay products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Nonferrous metals and products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Iron and steel products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Chemicals and related products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Pulp, paper and related products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Metal products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Plastic products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
General machinery and equipment  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Precision instruments  +
*  -
* Increase in supply
Transportation equipment  +
*  -
* Increase in supply
Electric machinery and equipment  +
*  + Increase in demand
<Oil-Specific Demand Shock>
Peak effect Peak effect Oil-Specific demand
Industry on output on prices shock effects
Petroleum and coal products Mixed  +
*
Ceramic, stone and clay products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Nonferrous metals and products Mixed  +
*
Iron and steel products  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Chemicals and related products Mixed  +
*
Pulp, paper and related products Mixed  +
*
Metal products Mixed  +
*
Plastic products Mixed  +
*
General machinery and equipment  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Precision instruments  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Transportation equipment  +
*  +
* Increase in demand
Electric machinery and equipment Mixed  +
Note: "+" and "-" represent peak positive and negative responses. "*" means that
         the peak responses are significant. "0" means the peak responses are negligible.
         "Mixed" means that the positive and negative responses are of similar magnitudes.